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Abstract
Firms in East Asia have extremely polarized funding patterns. Those that play a central
role in national development policies have easy access to markets for external funds, while
newly established firms face difficulties in accessing these markets due to the existence of
substantial information asymmetry. This paper discusses the development of the infomediary
industry in bond markets and the improvement of legislative procedures for liquidation, which
are necessary for the future development of bond markets. The paper argues that East Asian
corporate bond markets have implicitly imposed three requirements on corporate bond issuers
entering the market.
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Introduction 
Many policy initiatives have been carried out to promote regional bond market develop-
ment in East Asia. Typical examples are bond issuances by the World Bank and Asian
Development Bank in the Hong Kong market in the 1980s and the Asian Bond Market
Initiatives (ABMI) and Asian Bond Fund (ABF) since 2003. Although bond market develop-
ment in this region has been a long-term policy goal for multilateral development organiza-
tions for more than 20 years, the feasibility has been questioned every time practical issues are
considered. As a result, corporate bond issuance as a corporate financing strategy is only
available to a limited number of domestic firms.
In this study, reflecting the abovementioned regional objectives of the East Asian coun-
tries, we focus on the determinants of corporate bond issuance in the region. There is already
an existing literature on the determinants of corporate bond issuance in the industrialized
countries. Based on this literature, we begin by considering what theoretical framework should
be developed for emerging countries, and consider the hypothesis that what determines corpo-
rate bond issuance in emerging countries is different from that in industrialized countries. To
examine the hypothesis derived from the newly developed framework, we conduct empirical
tests using corporate data from selected East Asian countries ranging from 1991 to 2004.
The empirical results of the paper suggest that East Asian corporate bond markets have
implicitly imposed three requirements on corporate bond issuers – involving firm size, inter-
est coverage ratio and elapsed time after stock IPO – that are not always present in major
industrialized countries. We find that these three variables do not originate only from informa-
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tion asymmetry between issuers and investors, but also from the national development policy
of the various countries. 
2  Theoretical Framework and Test of the Hypothesis
As shown in Table 1, corporate bonds amounting to around USD397 billion were issued
in eleven countries in East Asia and Oceania in 2005. In terms of amount issued, primary mar-
ket development progressed rapidly through the years following market promotional policies.
However, markets in East Asia and the countries covered by this paper have yet to show con-
tinuous development and the issuers are limited to a very small group. 
The existing literature suggests that the creditworthiness of the firm, number of creditors,
and financing cost are the three main factors that influence the firm’s decision to choose bond
issuance, as argued by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and Bolton and Freixas (2000). These
studies note that start-up and venture firms that are financially dependent on internal funds
and bank borrowing are not able to issue corporate bonds due to their lack of creditworthi-
ness. Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Gilson et al. (1990) point out that bank borrowing
enables a firm to smoothly undertake corporate debt restructuring, in contrast to bond issues,
where it faces the difficulty of having to communicate with a large number of creditors. 
Based on a consideration of the above literature, the hypothesis of this paper is derived
from the following theoretical framework. Each firm has a project based on investment I at
date t=0 that yields returns at t=1 and t=2. The firm can invest at most w<I from internal
funds and must raise at least I-w from external funds, i.e., bank borrowing or bond issuance.
For simplicity, the profits of firm i at dates t=1 and t=2 can take only two values, r
L
, r
H
, with
r
H
>r
L
. The firm has two different probabilities p
1
(t=1) and p
2
(t=2) of obtaining high cash flow
realizations. Here, information on the value of p
1
is publicly available, but p
2
is private at t=0.
The probability that the value of p
2
=1 is o, which is revealed at t=2. The repayment schedule
of firm i’s bond issuance is R
1
H , R
1
L , R
2
H , R
2
L depending on the firm’s profitability at t=1 and
t=2. 
Under the above assumptions, the optimal contracting interest rate of bond issuance can
be derived by solving the following optimal contracting problem.
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
. .
max x
x x x
p R p R R B
p R p R v R v R A
s t
1
1 1 1 1
H
H
L
L
H
H
H L H L
1 1 1 1
1
2
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 $
- + - - + - +
+ - + + - + -
r r r
(1.1)
x
1
is the probability of continuation at t=1 and B is the private benefit the firm obtains at
date t=2 if it is not liquidated. A is the liquidation value at t=1 (r
L
<A<r
H
). The firm’s efficient
choice is x
1
=1 if ( )xvB v R v A1H H L1 2 $+ + + -r r .
While the abovementioned framework assumes that firm i is located in an industrialized
country where the bankruptcy law works fairly for both creditors and debtors, the firm cannot
always rationally choose x
1
=0 in East Asia. In this region, the number of bankruptcy petitions
is very small and the number of firms with x
1
=0 at t=1 is also small. Firm i is forced to choose
x
1
=1 even though ( )xvB v R v A1H H L1 2 #+ + + -r r at t=1, due to the existence of high liqui-
dation costs. Therefore, the optimal contracting interest rate of the corporate bond of the firm
with low profitability at t=2, as derived by Bolton and Freixas (2000), does not work out in
the market. 
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( ) ( )
lim v
p p v1 1 1
v
H L L
0
1 1
" 3
- - - - -r r r
"
(1.2)
Our hypothesis is that only firms with ν=1 publicly observable at t=0 can achieve x
1
=1
at t=1 and can issue corporate bonds in the East Asian bond market. 
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3  Empirical Analysis
3.1 The Empirical Model
Our empirical model assumes that firm size, years elapsed after stock IPO and interest
coverage ratio are three observable variables that enable underwriters to judge firm i’s p
2
at
t=0. 
BOND const SIZE ROA ICR IPO EXS RISKi 1 2 3 4 5 6= + + + + + + +a a a a a a n (1.3)
BOND: Corporate Bond Issued to Total Liability, SIZE: Total Assets, Logarithm of Millions of Local
Currency, ROA: Return on Assets, ICR: Interest Payment to EBITDA, IPO: Elapsed Years after Stock
IPO, EXS: export sales to Total Sales, RISK: Standard Deviation of ROA
Our hypothesis is based on the assumption that the parameters of SIZE and IPO are both
positive. This is based on the consideration that for large firms and firms for whom many
years have elapsed since the stock IPO, there is little information asymmetry between corpo-
rate insiders and investors. This paper assumes that investors can observe p
2
at t=0 when these
parameters are both positive. This paper also hypothesizes that the parameter of ICR is posi-
tive. This is because we assume that investors will believe that the probability of the issuer fil-
ing a bankruptcy petition at t=2 is small when the latest interest coverage ratio is high. 
For other variables, we expect the parameter of ROA to be negative since greater capabili-
ty to generate internal funds generally prevents reliance on external financing. To estimate (1.
3), two equations are estimated. The first employs corporate bond issues to total liability, and
the second corporate bond maturities, as independent variables. The dependent variables are
“1” when the firm issued bonds during the sample period, while the others are “0” in the case
of the first equation. In the second equation, the dependent variables are year of maturities.
Firms with no bond issuance record are “0” in this case. 
The variables of the first equation are averaged data for 1991-2003 for each individual
publicly listed firm, and each equation is estimated by probit estimation. The variables of the
second are panel data from 1999-2004, and the equations are estimated by random tobit esti-
mation. Delisted firms are included, but data from 1997-1998 are excluded from the sample.
Firms in the financial sector, utilities and government-sponsored enterprises are also exclud-
ed. 
SIZE is the total assets of each sample firm, ROA the return on assets, ICR the interest
payment to EBITDA, IPO elapsed years after initial public stock offering, EXS export sales
divided by total sales, and RISK the standard deviation of ROA in 1991-2003. The debt to
equity ratio is added as an independent variable and EXS and RISK are excluded when the
dependent variable is bond maturity. 
Kashyap et al. (1993) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) focus on how a change in the cen-
tral bank’s monetary policy is reflected in the liability structure of a borrower. Kashyap et al.
(1993) empirically demonstrate that borrowers prefer short-term financing strategies under a
phase of rising interest rates. Although Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find support for the
hypothesis that changes in funding cost influence the choice of financing strategy, they sug-
gest that it also depends on firm size. 
Intuitively, as mentioned in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), firm size may influence the
choice of financing strategy in East Asia. It is worth noting that corporate bond issuance in the
region is concentrated among large firms. Using the existing literature, in the next section we
theoretically explain why bond issuers are generally large firms.
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East Asian firms generally have high capital adequacy ratios, and some face difficulty in
accessing external funds, in a pattern similar to start-up and venture firms in industrialized
countries. In the latter case, this forces the firm to choose liquidation once a petition for bank-
ruptcy is declared. However, in East Asia, the number of petitions for bankruptcy is generally
small and the number of cases of corporate debt restructuring is even smaller. Intuitively,
therefore, the number of creditors providing funding does not intuitively influence the liability
structure in the region. 
3.2 Empirical Results
The empirical results shown in Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that the logarithm of a firm’s
total assets, which is a proxy for firm size, positively influences corporate bond issuance and
the length of bond maturity in all the East Asian countries except Taiwan. In addition, elapsed
years after stock IPO is positively related to these dependent variables in the six East Asian
countries. 
Table 3 also shows that the parameters of the interest coverage ratio, which is a proxy of a
firm’s creditworthiness, are significantly positive for all East Asian firms except those in
Japan. Consequently, these empirical results suggest that firm size, elapsed years after stock
IPO and firm’s creditworthiness simultaneously influence corporate bond issuance and the
length of bond maturity in East Asia. 
The empirical results for Taiwan are unique. Corporate bond issuance and length of
maturity are positively influenced by two of the three variables that our hypothesis regards as
important determinants of bond issuance. However, the parameters for firm size, alone among
the variables, are either significantly negative or insignificant. 
Summarizing the above, our empirical results suggest that the three determinants are sta-
tistically significant with consistent parameters signs in the three East Asian countries in Table
2 and four in Table 3. In these countries, the hypothesis of this paper that only firms with v=1
and that are publicly observable at t=0 can issue corporate bonds is supported. 
Firm size, one of the proxies of the degree of information asymmetry between issuers and
investors, is also regarded as an important determinant in East Asia. However, elapsed years
after stock IPO and interest coverage ratio, which are proxies for information asymmetry and
the issuer’s creditworthiness, respectively, are two determinants that make a difference for the
development of primary markets. 
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5. Discussion
The number of corporate bankruptcy petitions has been quite low even since a series of
bankruptcy law reforms were implemented in East Asia. For instance, in Indonesia the number
of petitions was 8 and 14 in 2000-2001, while in Japan it was 8,634 in 2000. A basic assump-
tion of this paper is that firm size and elapsed years after stock IPO are proxies for informa-
tion asymmetry between corporate insiders and investors. We empirically tested whether these
determinants influence the development of the primary bond markets in the region. The con-
clusion of the author’s interview surveys in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines in 2003 is
that investors avoid investing in bonds with low credit ratings since these frequently lead to
the incurrence of significant losses once debtors file bankruptcy petitions. The process of cor-
porate liquidation or reorganization of failed firms under current judicial systems is not suffi-
ciently credible to encourage investors to actively participate in the primary market.
Our empirical results indicate that firm size and elapsed years after stock IPO are posi-
tively related to corporate bond issuance. These results suggest that these two variables, as
proxies of information asymmetry, allow investors to judge an issuer’s future creditworthiness
and avoid being involved in the process of corporate liquidation or reorganization that poten-
tially leads to significant losses for investors. One of the issues that might be debated here is
that our empirical results suggest that firm size is commonly significant in countries in East
Asia. Firm size is regarded to be an important determinant even in the industrialized coun-
tries, where, historically, a number of infomediaries exist in addition to other financial inter-
mediaries. Firm size can be considered to be representative of several aspects of a corporate
issuer in addition to being a proxy for information asymmetry. It sometimes represents corpo-
rate reputation and the inverse of the probability of corporate bankruptcy.
In particular, the latter possibility has been discussed in many existing studies as an alter-
native theory. A large firm is generally regarded as having diversified business operations;
hence, the probability of its failure is lower than that of a firm with undiversified operations
since a slump in business operations in one sector will not directly lead to bankruptcy. In East
Asia, nevertheless, this variable taken together with corporate reputation and public recogni-
tion is more important than it is in industrialized countries. For several decades in some East
Asian countries, it can be considered that large private firms in business groups played impor-
tant roles, together with public institutions, in the national development plans. Accordingly,
such business groups may be regarded as having implicit government guarantees.
As for the standard deviation of ROA and interest coverage ratio, which we see as another
important determinant of bond issuance, the following are our considerations. A unique fea-
ture of the primary market in East Asia, in addition to the low number of bankruptcy petitions,
is that the number of bonds issued with low credit ratings is very small.1 We consider symmet-
ric issuer information to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for allowing investors to
judge an issuer’s future creditworthiness. In other words, few financial institutions consider
underwriting low-rated bonds, even when the issuer gives clear inside information. By con-
trast, the empirical results of Nagano (2007) suggest that firms in major industrialized coun-
tries indicate that these parameters are insignificant. Each individual element of raw data of
the sample firms suggests that bonds issued with low credit ratings were underwritten and
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1 Appendix Tables A and B show the number of corporate bonds rated by U.S. and local credit rating agencies. These
tables suggest that the number of rated bonds is small in all countries except the Philippines and New Zealand. The local
credit ratings are disproportionately distributed to investment qualified ratings as shown in Nagano (2007). 
sold to investors with higher interest rates, reflecting a higher credit risk premium. In industri-
alized countries, a default by an issuer does not always mean that the investor directly incurs a
significant loss, since liquidated assets cover agency costs, making the reorganized issuer
more profitable.
The empirical results of this paper imply that many start-up firms hardly participate as
issuers in East Asian bond markets. In the first part of the 1990s, some ASEAN countries
established secondary boards in their equity markets to promote SME development, but the
number of IPO firms has not necessarily increased. To promote the development of start-up
firms, our empirical results suggest the necessity of promoting infomediaries in each bond
market in order to mitigate information asymmetry, and improving the legislative procedures
for liquidation. 
6. Conclusion
This paper, based on empirical analyses of firms in the East Asian countries, found that
firms rarely use the corporate bond market even when they have high profitability. 
As frequently pointed out, firms in East Asia have extremely polarized funding patterns.
Historically, firms regarded as playing a central role in national development policies have
had easy access to markets for external funds, and, consequently, had high debt to equity
ratios. On the other hand, SMEs or start-up firms face difficulty in accessing these markets
due to the existence of substantial information asymmetry. Consequently, these firms typically
have very high capital adequacy ratios. Most corporate bond issuers belong to the former
group. Therefore, this paper finds that the development of the infomediary industry in bond
markets and improvement of legislative procedures for liquidation will be necessary for the
development of bond markets in the future. 
Areas that this paper could not touch upon or examine due to data limitations are as fol-
lows. According to the Bank for International Settlement, 45 percent of bonds issued by intra-
regional issuers in East Asia were underwritten by intra-regional investors. However, most of
these underwriters were subsidiaries or local branches of investment banks from industrialized
countries. Future work should examine the behavior of foreign and local underwriters and
how it influences each domestic corporate bond market. 
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Table A. Ratio of Issued Corporate Bonds Rated with Credit Rating Agencies in 2003-2005
(a) Rated by U.S. Credit Agencies
(b) Rated by Local Credit Agencies
Source: Aggregation by the author based on Bloomberg 
Note: The sample firms are non-financial firms.
